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  There is a large and growing literature on the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. It suggests a positive causal link 
running from finance to growth. We consider, in broad terms, the existing 
historical evidence on this connection. We demonstrate that constraints on 
investment finance occur primarily in the presence of fixed costs. Investments 
in physical transport infrastructures are prime examples of projects in which 
financial constraints can retard industrial growth. Furthermore, an appreciation 
of spatial and dynamic elements is central: Infrastructure development was 
privately financed by spatially concentrated coalitions of modest investors. We 
contrast the institutional environment in Britain with that in continental 
Europe. We develop a theory of finance and growth that can account for the 
disaggregated and dynamic nature of the finance and development of 
infrastructure. 
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 1 Introduction
A plethora of supportive empirical studies and a more sparse but equally support-
ive theoretical literature has engendered conﬁdence in the belief that there is a
causal relationship between ﬁnancial development and the long run level of eco-
nomic growth. We suggested in Trew (2006), however, that there are good reasons
for not proclaiming an end to the debate. First, we have argued that empirical
cross-section results are strongly biased toward accepting the ﬁnance-causes-growth
hypothesis. Second, much of theory and econometrics considers the question in only
its comparative sense; an understanding of transitional issues is commonly omit-
ted. This must have implications for policy in regard to the implementation of
any ﬁnance-led growth strategy within a country. Third, the connection between
theoretical mechanisms and empirical results in ﬁnance and growth has, largely,
been neglected. Speciﬁcally, the former typically looks at ﬁnancial eﬃciency; the
latter at ﬁnancial depth. How are eﬃciency and depth related, and what might a
theory calibrated to data tell us about the quantitative eﬀect of ﬁnance on growth?
Fourth, the theoretical microfoundations of ﬁnance and growth have not been fully
explored, leaving a large gap in our understanding of any causal link, however con-
vincing it is established in an empirical sense. Fifth, we have found indications
that aggregation issues play a highly signiﬁcant role in the relationship between
transitional growth paths and ﬁnancial matters. Where does the literature on
endogenous ﬁnancial coalitions and growth impact on contemporary ﬁnance and
growth theory? Sixth, we have seen that a dynamic ﬁnancial intermediation story
can be relevant. Omitting dynamic elements means that the ﬁnance-causes-growth
hypothesis is poorly-conceived as a policy tool when applied across heterogenous
economies.
At the heart of this critique is an uncertainty regarding the mapping between
cross-sectional results and the ability to explain time-series growth patterns. Fur-
ther, there is no clear theoretical understanding of the mechanisms by which this
mapping can be accounted for. How then can we view the relationship between
2ﬁnancial depth, ﬁnancial eﬃciency and industrial take-oﬀ within a country? The
remainder of this thesis will strive to address these questions.
Recent cliometric research has begun to consider the long-run time-series re-
lationships between measures of aggregate ﬁnancial depth and long-run growth.
Additional research on ﬁrm-level data has also been conducted. The ﬁndings from
these studies suggest to us that the positive relationship between ﬁnance and growth
is not entirely driven by selection bias. There is a positive correlation between ﬁ-
nancial development and economic growth. But still, aggregative cliometrics and
richer cross-sectional econometrics do not help us to address the more fundamental,
theoretical, issues regarding aggregation and the evolution of ﬁnancial conditions.
Understanding the dynamic interplay between ﬁnance and growth in an economy
as it goes through a period of transition from low to high growth will shed a great
deal of light on the remaining questions.
We intend to do two things in this paper: First, given the remaining questions
raised by our critique of empirical results and the paucity of any proper longitu-
dinal understanding, we delve into an examination of the ﬁnance-growth relation
based on historical evidence. This entails an analysis of historical accounts of the
ﬁnance-growth nexus, develops a number of key distinctions to be made in our
understanding of ﬁnance and growth, and introduces a new dataset of ﬁnancial
coalitions through the industrial revolution in the UK. Restricting our attention to
this evidence means that our ﬁndings have a particular implication for countries
going through industrialisation. The role of ﬁnancial markets in industrially de-
veloped economies going through transition from non-capitalism to capitalism has
been considered elsewhere, e.g., Colombo and Driﬃll (2003). Second, taking this
historical analysis as a guide, we develop a new theory of ﬁnance and growth that
can account for some of the dynamic, disaggregated elements found in our historical
analysis.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents our historical analysis.
Section 3 then constructs an endogenous growth model to account for the stylised
facts on ﬁnance and growth from the historical analysis. We then calibrate the
3model to data for industrial growth paths and then interpret these results. Section
4 concludes the paper with a summary of our main ﬁndings.
2 An Historical Context for Finance and Growth
Economic historians have long considered the industrial revolution from a macroe-
conomic perspective. The prime example is Landes (1969). More recently, Mokyr
(1990) has stressed many of the same issues. Such studies place the technologi-
cal progress at the heart of the growth mechanic, in concurrence with endogenous
growth theory (though the latter also places emphasis on the accumulation and
technology of human capital). The importance of ﬁnancial matters in determining
the rate of economic growth has, not least in the economic history literature, taken
a back-seat. The proposition that ﬁnancial constraints do not matter has commonly
been regarded as a truism: In this view, political and economic incentives are such
that impediments to the ﬁnance of entrepreneurship are at worst transitory. There
is, however, a great deal of evidence that this proposition is very far from a truism
and that, in fact, ﬁnancial constraints can have a signiﬁcant, if indirect, eﬀect on
industrial development. Reconciling these views requires us to take a more detailed
look at the ﬁnancial history, and this in turn requires more disaggregated and richer
data.
The analysis of the historical evidence below will, no doubt, paint too many
broad brush strokes for the liking of an economic historian. In looking to the
historical record for answers on any topic of debate a multitude of conﬂicting pieces
of evidence will always be found. Furthermore, we must, to some extent, generalise
away from historical detail in favour of telling a more cogent macroeconomic story.
This is necessary if we are to begin to place extant theories of ﬁnance and growth
into a more realistic setting. It is hoped that in making these compromises between
generality and speciﬁcs we do not move too far away from reﬂecting what actually
happened.
Subsection 2.1 considers some commonly-cited historical perspectives. Subsec-
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ship and industry. In doing this, we develop the central distinction to be made
between types of ﬁnance and the eﬀect of constraints on industrial development.
Subsection 2.3 develops this distinction by drawing on the historical record of in-
dustrial revolution in Europe. Subsection 2.4 introduces part of the new Handbook
of 18th and early 19th century British corporate ﬁnance. This Handbook sheds fur-
ther light on our historical analysis and enables us to draw some ﬁrmer conclusions.
Subsection 2.5 begins to draw-out some of the lessons from our historical analy-
sis. Subsection 2.6 then looks at these ﬁndings in the light of alternative policy
environments, speciﬁcally the European experience.
2.1 Historical Perspectives
The motivation of ﬁnance and growth as a subject for debate is often lent weight
via the views of various prominent ﬁgures in political economy. Naturally, these
views have played a part in shaping the way in which modern economists think
about the nexus.
Chief among the oft-cited critics of the view that ﬁnance leads growth is Robin-
son (1952, p.86), who famously wrote, “...where enterprise leads, ﬁnance follows.”
The impression given by this phrase belies a deeper, more qualiﬁed statement on
the importance of ﬁnancial constraints. Robinson (p. 87) distinguishes between ﬁ-
nance as a determinant of enterprise-led growth and as a determinant of ﬁnance-led
growth; she advocates the view that ﬁnance can constrain but only enterprise can
cause growth:
...the supply of ﬁnance cannot be regarded as a rigid bottleneck limiting
the rate of investment, but must be treated rather as an element in the
general atmosphere encouraging or retarding accumulation.
Lucas (1988) is also frequently cited as a contemporary critic of the view that
ﬁnancial constraints play any role. But his concern that the part played by ﬁnancial
matters in determining economic growth might be “over-stressed” does not preclude
5the importance of ﬁnancial ‘institutions’ per se. There is a distinction between
money-neutrality and ﬁnancial services that might reduce transactions costs. He
writes (ibid., p.6),
...insofar as the development of ﬁnancial institutions is a limiting factor
in development more generally conceived I will be falsifying the picture,
and I have no clear idea as to how badly.
The inadequacy of innovation in creating wealth, and the additional need for
eﬃcient ﬁnancial systems, was observed by Bagehot (1873). His Lombard Street was
among the ﬁrst to suggest that a scarcity of ﬁnance, “no spare money for new and
great undertakings” (ibid. para. I.6), can be an element in keeping poor countries
poor. Further, it is argued that an ineﬀectual institutional environment can mean
that in rich countries “the money is too scattered, and clings too close to the hands
of the owners, to be often obtainable in large quantities for new purposes.” He lauds
the London money market of Lombard Street as an “eﬃcient and instantly-ready
organisation,” (ibid. para. I.12). The perceived importance of eﬃcient ﬁnancial
markets is in allowing those that require it to obtain capital from disparate sources
at reasonable rates.
There are, for Schumpeter (1934), two agents of economic growth: The ﬁrst,
and better known, depicts innovation as a search for monopoly, or entrepreneurial,
proﬁt; the second stresses the importance of ﬁnance in determining the rate of eco-
nomic growth, not in simply emerging as an albeit necessary sideshow to technologically-
driven growth. The ﬁrst channel has been adapted into growth theory generally,
such as in Aghion and Howitt (1998). The second channel has latterly come to
support proponents of the ﬁnance-causes-growth school. Schumpeter (1934, p. 74)
wrote,
He [the banker] stands between those who wish to form new combinations
and the possessors of productive means. He is essentially a phenomenon
of development... He makes possible the carrying out of new combina-
tions, authorises people, in the name of society as it were, to form them.
6He is the ephor of the exchange economy.
The role of ﬁnancial intermediaries, according to Schumpeter, is in allowing
entrepreneurs to be entrepreneurs by mobilising scarce savings, evaluating research
projects, managing risk, evaluating future cashﬂow and facilitating transactions.
This is the familiar list of properties attributed by ﬁnance and growth researchers,
such as Levine (2005). For Schumpeter (op. cit., p. 77), an intermediary exists
to mitigate the entanglement of the “entrepreneur’s essential function...with other
kinds of activity, which as a rule must be much more conspicuous than the essential
one.”
The idea that ﬁnance impacts on growth via inhibiting entrepreneurship, and
so technological progress, has taken hold. Of course, ﬁnance is central for a healthy
entrepreneurship and so constraints on ﬁnance can have an impact. But what would
cause the banker to not stand as a conduit between savers and investors? In other
words, why does ﬁnance not follow enterprise? Schumpeter does not help us on
this: For him, the banker is a phenomenon of development. Robinson and Lucas,
among others, are only suspicious of arguments based on the exogenous existence,
exogenous persistence, and exogenous impact on entrepreneurship of imperfections
in ﬁnancial markets. How can we reconcile these views? We must consider why
such constraints arise in the context of economic development, how they persist
and in which economic arenas they act to dampen entrepreneurial spirit.
2.2 Historical Evidence
Among the major ﬁnancial innovations of the industrial revolution in Britain was
the creation of the limited liability joint-stock company in the middle of the nine-
teenth century. Before the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, those wishing to
establish a joint stock company had to obtain consent from the crown or through
Parliament. The Limited Liability Act of 1855 then allowed companies to be in-
corporated under the protection of limited liability for its investors. Robinson
(1952) puts the invention of the joint-stock company on a par with that of the
7steam-engine. Its formal emergence in England was, according to Hunt (1935a),
the outcome of economic necessity in the face of substantial legislative and judicial
opposition. This resistance was born partly out of lingering memories of the 1720
South Sea Bubble. As The Times of 1833 had it: “if, as a sleeping partner, [an in-
vestor] chooses to be robbed, the public ought not to be robbed because he chooses
to sleep.”1
The belated emergence of joint-stock ﬁnance was mirrored by the relatively late
growth of formal stock markets. But this apparent delay in the development of ﬁ-
nancial services did not prevent the emergence over the course of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century alternative, and eﬃcient, methods of industrial ﬁnance.
As Pollins (1954, p.230) succinctly puts it,
One of the commonplaces of English economic history is the fact that
manufacturing industry has seldom made use of the [London] capital
market machinery for the raising of its capital. In the early period of
industrialization small manufacturers were able to make use of their own
resources, or loans from friends or from banks; later they ploughed back
their proﬁts.
This view is one widely supported in the historical literature. Take Hudson
(2002, p.267): “It has long been accepted that internal self-ﬁnance was the dominant
form of industrial ﬁnance during the industrial revolution in England.”
Critical of this perspective, Harris (2000, p.289) argues that while Britain was
enjoying the world’s ﬁrst industrial revolution, the “formal legal framework of busi-
ness organization remained in its preindustrial state.” He argues that this relative
backwardness retarded entrepreneurial growth. He notes also, however, how the
business corporation evolved from its origination in the sixteenth century to legal
acceptance in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth. Further, this development “paralleled
the rise of capitalism, in its mercantilist and industrializing phases.” (p. 290, my
emphasis). He also points (p.127) to the number of alternative sources of ﬁnance in
1Quoted in Hunt (1935b), p. 342.
8eighteenth century England: Short-term credit and long-term personal borrowing
from “banks, merchants and kin” was commonplace. The movement towards the
use of stock issue as a method of ﬁnance occurred only gradually towards the end
of the century.
For Landes (1994, p. 641), “Once they [Europeans] caught the whiﬀ of wealth
in their sails, no change in government policy, no want of oﬃcial support, was going
to stop them.” Cottrell (1980) writes that it is more generally accepted, that “sav-
ings within the economy were not inadequate to support industrialization.” (p.5).
He also argues that proﬁt-ploughback was the principal method of ﬁnancing early
growth in manufacturing. Some cotton ﬁrms even began to borrow money from
their employees before looking to banks for ﬁnance. A reliance on bank ﬁnance for
long-term investments only occurred later, when proﬁt margins fell. In other words,
ﬁrms chose the method of ﬁnance to suit their current situation. Further, he argues
that the Bubble Act and Usury laws did not constitute an institutional barrier
to industrialisation. The later emergence of banking and stock markets reﬂected
not the release of some legislative or institutional constraint but an acceleration of
demand for them.
The order of ﬁnancing method also ﬁts in with the ‘pecking-order theory’ follow-
ing Myers (1984). The pecking-order of ﬁnance runs as follows: Internal ﬁnancing is
always preferable, followed, if external ﬁnance is unavoidable, by debt then equity.
So, agents were not constrained to use proﬁt ploughback or limited local credit in
the early stages of the industrial revolution: This was their preference.
These sources depict an historical record in which ﬁnancial constraints did not
have a direct negative eﬀect on the pace of industrialisation. The oft-cited example
of such constraints, the creation of the joint-stock company as an accessible legal
entity, was not central to the ﬁnance of the early part of the industrial revolution.
Further, the resistance to its entrance into legislation did not substantially inhibit
the pace of industrial growth. From this standpoint, the pattern of industrial
ﬁnance through Britain’s history is the outcome of relatively unconstrained optimal
ﬁnancing behaviour by ﬁrms in response to their desire for expansion under varying
9economic conditions.
This we take as the story of the ﬁnance of industry, in general. Proponents
of the enterprise-leads-ﬁnance school rightly say that ineﬃciencies in the ﬁnance
of industry, per se, have not constrained the economic development of the UK.
The same was true for continental Europe: Milward and Saul (1973) and Mathias
and Postan (1978) tell broadly similar stories in regard to the ﬁnance of European
industry. Earlier case studies of banking through industrialisation, such as Cameron
(1967, 1972) also support these conclusions.
If we consider that most investments in early industry could be small and/or
non-lumpy, then this consistent historical story is perhaps not so surprising: An
individual entrepreneur, especially a good one, could ﬁnd the little start-up capital
required or use reinvested proﬁts to expand as and when conditions allowed. Even
what we might think of to be a large ﬁxed cost in manufacturing, the factory
premises constructed to house workers and machines, were often rented in arrears
from more wealthy individuals, with multiple tenancy, subletting and power-sharing
prevalent (see Hudson, 2002).
In order to see where constraints on ﬁnance can have a real eﬀect, we need to
make a distinction between the types of activity requiring ﬁnance, based on the pro-
portion of the investment which is ﬁxed. Problems in raising ﬁnance for investment
largely occur where there is a large ﬁxed cost element. Large-scale infrastructure
projects are thus prime examples of the class of investments in which ﬁnancial con-
ditions can have a large eﬀect on economic growth. Among contemporary analyses,
Hulten (1996) and Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2004) indicate what we would expect: An
eﬀective supply (i.e., one that works eﬃciently) of infrastructure can have a large
eﬀect on the economic development of an industry that surrounds it. So while
ﬁnance does not directly constrain industry, it might inhibit the expansion of mar-
kets along both supply and demand lines via its impact on the growth of ﬁxed-cost
investments such as infrastructure.
In short, it is with regard to investments where ﬁxed costs are high that the
ﬁnancial system has to work harder. Without either wealthy backers or eﬃcient
10ﬁnancial market from which to obtain funds, an individual entrepreneur must either
obtain ﬁnance from a wide range of sources or forsake the opportunity. Often even
a serious backer could not provide all the start-up capital required, and joint-stock
operations became necessary. Take, for example, Milward and Saul (1973, pp. 347–
8) on the power of French joint-stock companies in comparison with the wealth of
even the deepest of individual pockets,
No matter how large the private fortune of even a family like the Roth-
schilds it could not hope to bear comparison with a capital fund which
was to be built up by selling shares to the public in relatively small
denominations and thereby mobilising the collected savings of France.
For investments with a large ﬁxed cost component, all those aspects of the policy,
legislative and institutional environment which, we hypothesise, might have an
impact on growth via ﬁnance come into sharper relief. We need to explore these
issues in greater depth.
2.3 Finance, Industrial Growth and Infrastructure
We have argued that ﬁnancial constraints did not directly inhibit the pace of indus-
trial growth. We suspect, however, that limitations on the availability of ﬁnance
can have an eﬀect on growth via their impact on projects where ﬁxed costs are a
large proportion of the investment.
For Bagehot (1873, para. I.6.), the absence of adequate ﬁnancial institutions is
directly related to diﬃculties in infrastructure development,
A citizen of London in Queen Elizabeth’s time could not have imagined
our state of mind. He would have thought that it was of no use inventing
railways (if he could have understood what a railway meant), for you
would not have been able to collect the capital with which to make
them.
How would we characterise an ‘eﬃcient’ market for the ﬁnance of infrastructure?
It must be one in which information ﬂows freely between large numbers of savers and
11investors. Financial constraints deriving from imperfections in ﬁnancial markets
are, in part, a product of both information asymmetry and the politico-institutional
environment. In theory, it has been shown that deviations from the complete
ﬁnancial markets of Arrow-Debreu can arise as a result of information problems.
For Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), costs to the acquisition of information mean that
information-eﬃcient markets are impossible. We might add to the costs of obtaining
information the (related) costs of forming comprehensively complete contracts.
The purpose of this section is to investigate the realities of those information
problems, which costs exist to cause them, and the ways in which they impacted
upon optimal ﬁnancial systems. We also look at the part played by the institutional
and legislative environment in this context. We are able to see the eﬀect that
ﬁxed costs have on the nature of the ﬁnancial systems that emerge to cope. We
characterise in detail, using both secondary and primary sources, the nature of the
ﬁnancial coalitions that emerged to supply infrastructure and how these typically
evolved over time. In Section 3 we develop a model that can capture a number of
the macroeconomic implications for ﬁnance and growth, leaving to Nolan and Trew
(ming) a deeper theoretical investigation into some of the microeconomic roots of
our ﬁndings.
We focus on the ﬁnance of physical transport infrastructure for four reasons:
They are a classic example of investment projects in which ﬁxed costs are a large
element; the development of an eﬀective infrastructure is strongly correlated with
industrial development; infrastructures are constructed using both public ﬁnance
and private enterprise under public regulations; and, perhaps most importantly,
there is a great deal of historical and cliometric evidence covering the ﬁnance of
infrastructure through the period of industrial revolution.
We can broadly date the phases of each of the main forms of transport infras-
tructure in the UK: In the 1750s and 1760s, there was a boom in the number of
turnpike trusts; from the 1760s to the 1850s canals dominated, with a boom in
1792–3; and from the 1830s the ‘Railway Age’ commenced. The ﬁrst railway ‘ma-
nia’, of 1843–47, saw capital expenditures on railways increase tenfold in the space
12of ﬁve years (see Kenwood, 1965).
For reference, we replicate in Figure 1 these phases of infrastructure development
against time paths for the per capita volume of industrial production, using the data
in Bairoch (1982). The data (reproduced in Appendix Table ??) are normalised
relative to 100 in the UK for the year 1900. We can see that the UK had an early
lead in industrial take-oﬀ which was sustained for over a century and a half.
Figure 1: Per Capita Industrial Production and UK Infrastructure, 1750–1980
The recent dispute between Landes (1994, 1995) and Crafts (1995a,b) demon-
strates that there are no simple answers to the question ‘Why Was England First?’
Additionally, we have argued above that underlying shifts in technological progress,
those which are subject to entrepreneurship, have not been signiﬁcantly dampened
by ﬁnancial constraints. We are not suggesting a new ‘single-cause’ explanation.
What we wish to understand, however, is whether ﬁnancial constraints might have
played a part in limiting the growth rate through their eﬀect on the development
of infrastructure.
The early history of the development of physical infrastructure in England was
13one of private enterprise and local ﬁnance. Government practiced its regulatory role
with a light-touch, enforcing only some standards on construction and maintenance.
Except for major disputes over land use, Parliament did not meddle with the layout
of infrastructure.
Along with the standardisation in the construction of infrastructure, the indus-
trial revolution saw a gradual standardisation of the way in which infrastructure
ﬁnance was regulated through Parliament. The Bubble Act of 1720 necessitated
that joint-stock companies be authorised by royal charter. Thus, the construction
of any piece of infrastructure required a Bill to be passed in Parliament. Further,
from 1794, after the canal mania, requirements for an infrastructure Bill included
the need to deposit three things: A map of landholdings in the vicinity of the
project; reference books (linked to the map of landholdings) of landowners and
occupiers as well as their support or opposition to the plan; and, a subscription list
of proposed ﬁnancial supporters. These deposits enabled Parliament to judge not
only the likely success of the proposed project, but also to consider conﬂicting local
interests before securing private property rights to a corporation.
Most of the evidence cited on the ﬁnance of infrastructure is based on analysis
of these records. As such, it is an excellent source and we can read a great deal
into them with conﬁdence. Using these sources also means, however, that they
often cover only the initial period of any piece of infrastructure and not its perfor-
mance over time after its construction. We pay attention to dynamic analyses of
infrastructure ﬁnance wherever possible.
2.3.1 The Emergence of Turnpikes in the UK
A surprising amount of evidence can be drawn upon to characterise the emergence
of turnpike trusts in the early and middle parts of the eighteenth century. Prior
to the enactment of legislation allowing the establishment of turnpike trusts, road
maintenance was carried out by local parishes, funded by levying local taxes. From
the beginning eighteenth century, however, Parliament could approve the establish-
ment of individual turnpike trusts. The trusts could raise ﬁnance through issuing
14debt and levying tolls on road users. Bogart (2005) suggests that this institutional
innovation brought forth a wider road transport revolution. It is beyond question
that the construction of canals and railways aided industry by reducing the cost of
transporting goods. Bogart shows that, in addition to waterways and railways, the
levying of tolls by turnpikes did not increase freight charges, and may have even
reduced them.
Buchanan (1986, p.227) notes that most turnpike companies “were run by men
representative of the economic life of the area.” His analysis sheds light on the ex-
istence of a signiﬁcant regional capital market and demonstrates, using the Ward
(1974) classiﬁcation scheme, that investors were large in number and from a wide
range of social strata. Further to this, Bogart (2006a) ﬁnds regional and network
eﬀects in the diﬀusion of turnpikes. Turnpike trusts were typically spatially con-
centrated in the vicinity of major economic centres.
2.3.2 Financing the UK Canal Network
Ward (1974) develops a highly detailed analysis of the ﬁnance of canal companies
in England through the eighteenth century. A group of industrial and merchant
leaders would see the ‘economic’ motive, in terms of the direct beneﬁt to their
business, of installing a canal in their vicinity. These promoters would then either
call upon a ﬁnancier, or become ﬁnanciers themselves, to sell scrip and shares in
a joint-stock canal company under a ‘ﬁnancial’ motive of potential future returns
on holding the issue. Ward shows that canals were generally ﬁnanced by those
local to the route of the canal. The ﬁnanciers would tour local public houses, hold
town meetings, coax relatives and friends, to convince local individuals to invest
in the scheme. Those who invested were by no means uniformly wealthy. Ward
classiﬁes investors by occupation and social status, showing that the majority of
investments came from local landowners, merchants, tradesmen, manufacturers and
professionals – people whose wealth was not only relatively limited but also mostly
tied up in their primary employment.
The spatial concentration was, particularly during and after investment booms,
15sometimes a restriction ordered by ﬁnanciers wishing to avoid speculative invest-
ment. More often, however, the parochial nature of ﬁnance was a result of informa-
tional asymmetries: A local familiarity with market conditions, with local industry
and an aﬃnity with the canal promoters made it more easy to raise ﬁnance locally
than on the London market. Ward puts the spatial concentration down to inequal-
ities in the social and geographic distribution of capital. He notes (ibid., p.171–2)
an unwillingness of London creditors to invest in regional infrastructure projects
because “appropriate capital markets did not exist and the scale of investment was
insuﬃcient to support them.” We prefer to interpret this observation in the following
way: The costs of forming spatially concentrated coalitions of small investors was,
under the institutional environs, less than the costs of inducing interest from those
with more investment experience and deeper pockets. We come on to the possible
reasons for this below. This pattern is seen across the country and throughout the
century. Ward notes, however, that through the eighteenth and into the nineteenth
century, centralised stock markets became more willing to support infrastructure
projects; in the process, the problems of ﬁnance were gradually relaxed.
Turnbull (1987) ﬁnds not only a similar pattern of regional ﬁnance of canals
but also a localised pattern in the construction of canals. The importance of an
integrated, national system of waterways gave way to local and regional demands
for routes unconnected to trunk lines. Canals were built as local enterprises ﬁrst,
and formed part of a national network only later. This was the outcome of market
forces, and reﬂects the idea that the industrial revolution was regional. For Cot-
trell (1980, p.19), the “industrial revolution... was essentially a process of regional
growth.” Recent work, such as O’Brien (2006), continues a growing literature on
the industrial revolution as a provincial phenomenon.
2.3.3 The Finance of Railways in the UK
There is a great deal of evidence that railways were ﬁnanced using methods similar
to those employed in turnpikes and canals, namely spatially concentrated coalitions
of local, relatively modest investors. Hunt (1935b) suggests that the English railway
16network was established without the use of the London stock exchange. Pollins
(1954, pp.230–1) describes the establishment of a typical railway during the ﬁrst
half of the nineteenth century:
Some public-spirited men...would recognize the need for improved com-
munication in their locality. They would subscribe among themselves to
ﬁnance a survey, or would call public meetings in the locality to arouse
support and obtain subscriptions. Later a deﬁnite route would be de-
cided upon, public meetings held to sell scrip, and the committee of the
company would appoint local agents to obtain subscriptions and take
deposits. Those who took scrip would be asked to sign the subscrip-
tion contract (or parliamentary undertaking) required by parliamentary
Standing Orders, and an application would be made to parliament for
an Act of incorporation.
Pollins suggests this process is repeated across the country in the ﬁnance of canals,
tunnels, docks and railways. Again, it is observed that companies often reserved
shareholdings for local landowners and occupants of towns along the route of the
railway. He suggests there was also some element of learning to the emergence
of ﬁnancial coalitions: Before a new form of transport has been tried and tested,
potential investors took more convincing that buying shares was worthwhile. Even
once technologically proven, during boom-periods a proximity to the route of a
proposed railway aided potential investors in deciding over which railway companies
to support. Only after a few years of local ﬁnance did companies ﬂoat on the stock
exchange.
Broadbridge (1955) also ﬁnds similar results on the spatially concentrated nature
of early railway capital. That paper also points to the later emergence of regional
centres of ﬁnance, particularly in the North of England. A good deal of even Scottish
railway stock was held in Lancashire. He tracks a gradual movement in the second
half of the nineteenth century away from local subscription toward London. This
did not happen just because the stock market was there, but because conditions
17and capital requirements changed: His evidence supports the “conventional view
that railways were drawing their capital from ever-widening sources in the early
1840’s, as compared with previous decades.” (ibid., p.206).
To ﬁrm-up our understanding of the ﬁnancial coalitions formed to ﬁnance infras-
tructure projects during the industrial revolution we can draw upon a new dataset
of corporate ﬁnance built by Gary Shea. We summarise current ﬁndings from Shea
(2007) in the next section, and give a concrete example of how these sorts of ﬁndings
can be drawn.
2.4 The Shea Handbook
We intend to give an indication of the sorts of data that can be drawn upon to
make inferences about the ﬁnance of infrastructure. To do so, we present a case
study from Shea (2007). The full Handbook, once completed, will cover a number of
case studies, for around 20 railways, 80 canals, 20 energy companies, and 40 others
over the period 1760-1834.
We include here an example of how such records, along with other materials,
can be used to illustrate the successful projection of a local infrastructure project.
There is nothing special about the Wigan Branch Railway. It was minor railway,
but it was typical of about another 6 or 7 small railways built in Lancashire from
the late 1820’s and it was typical of how many other early British railways, canals
and gas and water supply were built.
Figure 2 maps the route of the railway, as well as noting those landowners along
the route who also invested in the railway company. These landowners comprised
almost 10% of total capital investment. Figure 3 gives a breakdown of investors
under the Ward (1974) classiﬁcation scheme.
We can see clearly from these Figures how investment in the Wigan Branch
Railway was heavily ﬁnanced by share issue, not debt acquisition. It suggests that
shares were not purchased by a small number of very wealthy individuals, but by a
large number of relatively modest local capitalists, manufacturers, tradesmen and
18Figure 2: Wigan Branch Railway: Geography
professionals. It also clearly demonstrates how these investors were spatially con-
centrated around the location of the railway, and suggests a pattern for landowners
along the path of a railway to also invest in it.
2.5 Regional Growth, Spatial Concentrations and Dy-
namic Aspects
We can summarise a few stylised facts from the above analysis in relatively short
order. The ﬁnance of early infrastructures in Britain generally took the form of
spatially concentrated coalitions of large numbers of relatively modest individuals.
19Figure 3: Wigan Branch Railway: Investors
In the early stages, infrastructure development was also nationally disjointed. A
national network emerged later, as the industrial revolution took hold. At the same
time, centralised ﬁnancial markets became the primary method of raising ﬁnance,
and infrastructure projects could raise ﬁnance from the stock exchange or large
banks.
How should we interpret both the nature of coalitions and their change over
time? The scale and form of ﬁnancial intermediation was the key decision in any
entrepreneurs’ attempt to ﬁnance an infrastructure project. We need to consider
how the costs of intermediation are related to its scale; the role played by informa-
tion asymmetries must be central.
In the early stages of development, the cost of obtaining external ﬁnance from
central ﬁnancial markets was greater than the cost of raising it from scratch from
among a relatively modest local populace. Even though the process of raising
local ﬁnance in this way was time-consuming and expensive, lesser information
problems at the local level made local markets preferable to seeking ﬁnance in more
20distant ones. This must have something to do with the cost of forming eﬀective
contracts. For ﬁnancial coalitions to form, members must be contracted into it:
Payoﬀs, responsibilities, and other actions must be speciﬁed in an environment
where there may be a great deal of uncertainty about the future. The costs of
forming these contracts cannot always be considered to be negligible. And there
is a consequent decision to be made about the quality of that contract (i.e., how
well it speciﬁes party behaviour, how many loopholes are left, how enforceable it
is), given its cost. We might think of an inverse relationship between the quality
of a contract and its cost. Moreover, there will be a degree of heterogeneity: Some
agents are better informed, or better educated than others while the level of trust
between agents can also vary. In addition, the institutional environment can aﬀect
the costs of forming contracts (and so the choice of contract quality) by, among
other things, establishing industry standards, supporting property rights, easing
the gathering of information and enforcing written contracts. We come on to these
issues in Nolan and Trew (ming).
The very existence of spatially concentrated ﬁnancial coalitions suggests that
the national ﬁnancial market was not eﬃcient in informational and contractual
terms. In the absence of information and contracting problems at the national
level, and given a conducive institutional environment, a national ﬁnancial market
would have been ﬁrst-best eﬃcient in terms of the supply of ﬁnance. Without
such an eﬃcient national ﬁnancial market, ﬁnanciers’ only alternative was to build
ﬁnancial coalitions of local investors.
We cannot draw from this that the ﬁnancial arrangements which emerged to
ﬁnance infrastructure were not themselves optimal: Given the costs and beneﬁts of
obtaining information, and the costs and beneﬁts of forming contracts, the ﬁnancial
structures observed through the industrial revolution might simply have equated
marginal conditions in information gathering and contract writing. But this is not
just a problem of private arrangements. It should be clear that the costs of ob-
taining information and forming contracts can be subject to further institutional
and legislative constraints. Further, the capacity of the public purse to mitigate
21information problems is itself not limitless: Optimal levels of public expenditure,
and so optimal levels of taxation, follow. There is then, in theory at least, an op-
timal combination of private and public behaviour that combines to support the
optimal, private, ﬁnancial arrangement. We develop a theoretical framework for un-
derstanding these trade-oﬀs in Trew (2007). For the purposes of the current paper,
we abstract from formalising the existence of optimal information extraction and
optimal contract formation. Our focus is, then, on the institutional environment as
the source of ineﬃciencies (sub-optimal outcomes) in the ﬁnance of infrastructure.
Even where the institutional and legislative environment deviates from that which
was optimal, we consider that rational private arrangements to mitigate informa-
tion problems were optimal responses to both the present institutional conditions
and the private costs and beneﬁts of obtaining information and writing contracts.
Despite the spatial concentration that characterised the early industrial period,
there was an institutional and economic learning process. Over time, as infrastruc-
tures became larger, as industrial centres became more evident and as industrial
development began to require more sophisticated external ﬁnancing, the ﬁnancial
systems of London evolved into markets more capable of evaluating distant (and,
increasingly, larger) infrastructure projects. Institutional and legislative changes
played a part in this evolution. It has been argued that the government played a
role in advancing property rights and encouraging the private provision of public
goods. Bogart and Richardson (2006) introduce a large database on the passage
of Acts of Parliament and show that the passage of Acts pertaining to enforcing
property rights and encouraging public good provision were positively correlated
with (and sometimes led) the provision of infrastructure and the rate of economic
growth in the run-up to industrial revolution. That papers also draws attention to
the unique position that Parliament held in acting as a forum for transforming the
structure of landholding into its modern, capitalist form. As they note, in most
other nations this transformation was delayed and, in France and Russia, sowed
the seeds of revolution.
Through the middle of the nineteenth century, centralised and specialised ﬁnan-
22cial services gained precedence and began to cater for the greater demands of larger
infrastructure projects. The informational problems at the national level began to
wane as the institutional framework for centralised ﬁnance developed, and as the
returns on infrastructure investment became more reliable. Eventually, central ﬁ-
nancial markets were such that constructing local and regional coalitions of ﬁnance
was the less eﬃcient method of ﬁnance.
The pattern in provincial infrastructure development is mirrored by the provin-
cial nature of the industrial revolution. Disjointed local and regional infrastructures
supported a local and regional industrial growth that itself comprised, on the na-
tional level, a disjointed patchwork of regional economies. As the national economy
emerged, so, in parallel, did both the national infrastructure and the national ﬁ-
nancial markets to ﬁnance it.
So there are three eﬀects here: First, a learning process in national ﬁnancial mar-
kets made them gradually more amenable to the ﬁnance of distant infrastructure
projects; second, the development of political and institutional environment had an
impact on the eﬃciency of centralised ﬁnancial markets; and third, economic de-
velopment and the growth of the stock of infrastructure made economic integration
and market expansion an additional incentive to build and ﬁnance infrastructure
nationally.
We develop in Section 3 a model of ﬁnance and growth that can capture a num-
ber of the stylised facts we have outlined here. Before that, we look in Subsection
2.6 at whether alternative policy environments, such as a bias toward public ﬁnance
and public planning, had an eﬀect on the development and ﬁnance of infrastructure
in other countries going through industrial revolution.
2.6 Alternative Policy Environments
To appreciate properly the experience of British infrastructural development we
must look at it in the light of a wider context. France is a good example of a
very diﬀerent approach to that in Britain. We might also look to the emerging
23body of cliometric research on the US and Canada to widen the application of
our hypotheses: Wright (2002) draws attention to the importance of information
problems in the emergence of the US ﬁnancial system over the period 1780–1850;
and, Sylla et al. (2006) track the integration of transatlantic capital markets through
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century. We focus on the Anglo-French contrast
here, since it serves to motivate an understanding of the ﬁnance of infrastructure in
what were, at the outset of the industrial revolution in Britain, otherwise relatively
similar economies.
Broadly, the development of British infrastructure was one based on market
forces; that of France was the outcome of public planning and a great deal public
ﬁnance. The French industrial revolution occurred much later than in Britain, some
argue that it began properly as late as the 1850s; this is aﬃrmed by inspection of
Figure 1.
Milward and Saul (1973) are among those that put the delay in French economic
development down, in part, to the way in which infrastructure policy was formed.
French governments of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century initiated
a publicly ﬁnanced, centrally planned and tightly regulated system of canals that,
it was intended, would serve all citizens at no charge. The Becquet plan of 1822
envisioned a public-private partnership: A rational (i.e., centrally planned) water-
way system paid for by private capital. A group of civil engineers, the Corps des
Ponts et Chauss´ ees, was charged with setting and enforcing the regulations for a
waterway network of suﬃcient quality. The plans did not come to full fruition. The
routes which did get built quickly were those where local economic demands most
greatly necessitated them.
L´ evy-Leboyer (1978) notes that the centralised nature of infrastructural devel-
opment in France extended beyond canals and covered also railways. There was,
in addition, a great deal of overlap in the plans. The Corps, at ﬁrst, viewed rail-
roads as ‘dry canals’. Smith (1990, p.665) writes that Becquey and the Corps were
remembered for “committing their country to waterways on the eve of the railroad
age.”
24Many of the new railway schemes were in direct competition to the previously
planned canal networks. A solution based on complementarity between railways
and waterways was found: Canals, it was thought, served best the transport of
heavy goods while railways carried light goods and passengers. Indeed, plans for
some stretches of infrastructure speciﬁed parallel lines of canal and railway (see
Figure 2 in Smith, 1990).
The Legrand plan of 1838 began to map the national plan for canals to one for
railways. A system of trunk lines emanating from Paris to each of the largest cities
was envisaged, a so-called Legrand Star. Private companies were restricted from
constructing major routes for fear that it would interfere with the greater plan. Up
till 1837, only three private bids to construct railways were accepted. From 1865,
smaller lines could, at the discretion of local authorities, be appended to the trunk
lines as and when local economic conditions demanded.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Napoleon III began to promote the
private ﬁnance of a dominant railway infrastructure. Private infrastructure devel-
opments were still subject to the layout, location and speciﬁcations dictated by
the Corps. Milward and Saul (1973, p. 336) note that government “beset rail-
way building with so many safeguards as to delay its ﬂourishing by a full decade.”
Again, those railway lines that were taken up were those in greatest demand by
local industry.
The French experience of public planning can be contrasted with the experience
of Germany. There, it is argued, the country was able to construct a railway infras-
tructure much more quickly because of less stringent requirements on standards and
a more liberal approach to the granting of private enterprises. Further, the political
fragmentation of mid-nineteenth century Germany allowed separate regions to go
ahead with railway developments in opposition to more central directives: Regional
political units could better coordinate infrastructural development.
In our discussions of previous sections we viewed the ﬁnance of infrastructure in
Britain as somewhat ineﬃcient. The experience of France suggests at least that the
encouragement of private ﬁnance and a relatively laissez-faire approach to regula-
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We do not wish to imply (though it is by some) that the retardation of infrastruc-
tural development was the root of the delayed entrance of France into high growth
paths, of course there can be many other reasons.
There is, however, further evidence on the relations between infrastructure de-
velopment, policy issues and economic growth. Hulten (1996) draws attention to
the importance of maintaining an eﬀective stock of infrastructure. Using World
Bank indices for road condition, locomotive availability, electricity loss and tele-
phone faults, the paper ﬁnds a link between the eﬀectiveness of infrastructure and
the rate of economic growth. A large positive impact on growth of improving the
eﬀectiveness of a given stock of infrastructure is found, especially among poor coun-
tries. Bogart (2006b), using cross-country evidence for the nineteenth century, ﬁnds
a strong and positive correlation between the level of investment in railways and the
proportion of private ownership. Further, the rate of railway diﬀusion is positively
related to the extent of private sector involvement.
So policy can have a role to play in the development of infrastructure, and
this role can have implications for ﬁnancial development. But we do not seek
to draw ﬁrm conclusions on the role of policy in the ﬁnance of infrastructure.
Counterfactuals can always be found to any argument based on case studies. The
experience of Germany may be one such counterfactual. We rather think of policy,
with apologies to Robinson (1952), as an element in the general atmosphere of
encouraging or retarding the ﬁnance of eﬀective infrastructures.
3 Some Analytics of Growth, Finance and In-
frastructure
Given what we have learned from the historical analysis above, we now proceed
to construct a theory of ﬁnance and growth that can account for a number of the
disaggregated and dynamic aspects observed. We wish to capture the stylised facts
26from our historical analysis in a relatively transparent model of ﬁnance and growth
that can be, broadly, matched to data. Our model is distinct from work such as
Acemoglu and Zillibotti (1997) primarily because an economy in our model can be
caught in a low-growth trap. In the paper of Acemoglu and Zillibotti, industrial
take-oﬀ is an inevitability. Though it might reﬂect on some levels the relationship
between ﬁnance and growth in countries (or regions) that do industrialise, it does
not help us to understand why some countries do and other countries do not enter
periods of sustained high growth.
We ﬁrst describe the structure of our model before presenting it in more formal
terms. We have a closed economy with two major regions. Factors of production
are capital and infrastructure. Following the discussion above, we also consider
that this infrastructure is the product of private enterprise. A local supply of
infrastructure beneﬁts all those ﬁrms who pay for it.
Firms have no trouble raising capital; they can use proﬁt-ploughback or sell
claims on future proﬁts. But infrastructure projects are subject to signiﬁcant ﬁxed
costs; they cannot be funded by individual ﬁrms or individual agents alone. En-
trepreneurs exist to see the demand for infrastructure and organise ﬁnance via
ﬁnancial intermediation to construct and lease infrastructure to ﬁrms. In this vein,
we account for the interaction between infrastructure and ﬁnancial intermediation
by thinking of infrastructure as a direct input to production; the eﬃciency of ﬁ-
nancial intermediation then determines the costliness of raising ﬁnance for that
infrastructure. Firm output is determined in part by the level of infrastructure
that the ﬁrm is willing to pay for, given the costs of raising ﬁnance for that infras-
tructure.
In Trew (2007) we consider in greater detail the interaction between the costli-
ness of exchange and the institutional, economic and social environment in which
exchange takes place. The purpose of the remainder of this paper, however, is to
lay-out the implications of the discussion from Section 2 for a relatively standard
theory of ﬁnance and growth. This then serves as a bridge between the critique of
current theory and a closer look at the fundamentals driving these interactions.
27So, the employment of infrastructure as a factor of production incurs the costs
of ﬁnancial intermediation. The economy is populated by agents endowed with a
money income each period. We could otherwise have thought of agents endowed
with a unit of labour earning a money income by renting their labour to ﬁrms.
When agents in the economy see the demand for infrastructure they can become
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs use the services of a ﬁnancial intermediary to raise
ﬁnance for the construction and maintenance of an infrastructure. Entrepreneurs
then rent that infrastructure to the ﬁrm.
We do not have to restrict the intermediary, or even the entrepreneur, to being
external to the ﬁrm; we simply want to allow for an eﬀect of intermediation costs
on spatial decisions and growth. Of course, it is likely that specialised ﬁnancial
intermediation will emerge, so we naturally think of the existence of a market for
ﬁnancial intermediation. Additionally, it may be that the ﬁnancial intermediary is
also the entrepreneur supplying infrastructure to the ﬁrm. For clarity, we think of
ﬁrms, entrepreneurs and intermediaries in isolation.
3.1 Finance, Productivity and Economic Integration
We found a clear and consistent pattern in the historical evidence discussed above:
In the early stages of development ﬁnancial coalitions, infrastructure and markets
are, broadly, local; as the economy grows infrastructures grow, ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation becomes more sophisticated and markets become more national. We wish to
account for and understand these eﬀects: Why do ﬁrms choose local markets at low
levels of development? Might an economy be trapped in a spatially disparate, low-
growth trap? What characterises the transition from small, spatially concentrated
markets to large, national ones? What part does the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation play? What government policies might instigate faster growth paths?
In a set-up with two regions, funds can be raised at the regional level, via
regional ﬁnancial intermediaries, or at the national level, using national ﬁnancial
intermediaries. We make two central assumptions: 1) A regional ﬁnancial interme-
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the scale of the infrastructure that it employs. The costs of ﬁnancial intermediation
are subject to scale eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we impose that ﬁnancial intermediation at
the national level can, ceteris paribus, be more costly.
Part of the incentive for ﬁrms to operate at the national level arises from ex-
tensive scale eﬀects, that is, scale eﬀects resulting from the linking of separate
economies. For McDermott (2002, p. 373), extensive scale increases potential in-
come partly by enhancing “the productivity of research and study”. Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991) takes a similar perspective in the context of an endogenous
growth theory. In Alesina et al. (2000) productivity is directly related to economic
integration via the imposition of iceberg costs in the trade of intermediate goods. In
our economy, the integration of two regions into a national economy raises ﬁrm-level
productivity and can obtain a higher growth rate.
Extensive scale also has a role in ﬁnancial intermediary conditions. We consider
two types of eﬀect: Fixed information costs and learning costs. The historical
analysis above has indicated that both ﬁrms and investors can have a preference
for local ﬁnance where markets are small. We have argued that this is the result of
a bias towards exchange and ﬁnance with those who are geographically closer which
arises when the returns to centralised ﬁnance are outweighed by its costs . This
is what we call the ﬁxed information cost: It is easier for an entrepreneur, E, to
convince an investor, I, to invest if I knows and trusts E personally; if E has a good
local reputation; if I knows the local market conditions well; if institutional factors
are conducive to I evaluating E; if if I can more easily monitor the activities of E.
We posit that these scale eﬀects are ﬁxed; they hold true no matter what the market
size. What is important, however, is that these information costs can depend on
the legislative and institutional environment within which exchange takes place.
We use this ﬁxed scale eﬀect to capture exogenous changes in the institutional
environment.
We have also seen that a transition from spatially concentrated ﬁnance and mar-
kets to economy-wide ﬁnance and markets can occur. We have suggested that this
29is not entirely the result of exogenous changes in political or institutional factors.
We can, in part, put it down to endogenous changes in ﬁnancial intermediation con-
ditions. We account for, in addition to the ﬁxed information cost eﬀect, a learning
cost in ﬁnancial intermediation. We have seen hints of this eﬀect in the historical
analysis. We can think of four separate eﬀects, though there are, no doubt, more.
First, consider a demonstration eﬀect: It is harder to raise ﬁnance for the ﬁrst
national turnpike/canal/railway than it is for the ﬁftieth because of the initial
newness of a technology or as a result of the unwillingness to risk money when the
demand is uncertain. As a new form infrastructure is tried and tested by those
willing to make initial investments, and as the demand for said infrastructure is
demonstrated, it becomes progressively easier to raise ﬁnance. Secondly, a scale
eﬀect in construction can be considered: The ﬁrst national turnpike/canal/railway
will be more expensive to build than the ﬁftieth. This can result from technological
improvements in rolling-out an infrastructure as it is used more. Third, there will be
a learning eﬀect in the technology of ﬁnancial intermediation at the national level.
We have seen that sophisticated ﬁnancial markets do only emerge gradually, and
that this emergence often parallels the growth of the economy. Fourth, the demand
for major infrastructure projects that require national ﬁnancial intermediation only
occurs over time, as the economy grows regionally and as regional infrastructure
networks are contstructed.
Of course, we are abstracting from such market-eﬀects at the regional level for
simplicity. In practice, these learning eﬀects will exist at the regional level. The
diﬀerence is that at the regional level these eﬀects can be greatly mitigated because
of the local nature of the investors.
Intermediation at a regional level is thus optimal when learning and ﬁxed costs
are relatively high. As the regional economies grow so learning costs fall (with
the building of a regional infrastructure) and national integration becomes more
feasible. Likewise, if market-invariant information costs fall at a national level, we
can move from an equilibrium with two regions to an equilibrium with one national
economy. If the regional economy lies on the balanced growth path then over time
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be three possible outcomes, dependent on both the extent of information costs
of national intermediation and initial infrastructure conditions: Information costs
remain high and regional economies are optimal in the long run; information costs
are low, initial infrastructure is good and economy-wide output is optimal from the
start; or information costs and initial infrastructure are such that we begin with
regional economies and (via falling learning costs or exogenous institutional shifts)
we move endogenously to a national economy.
3.2 Formal Model
We have two regions, A and B, in the same closed economy (i.e., there are no
exchange rate complications here). In each region there are #FA and #FB ﬁrms,
respectively, and #CA and #CB consumers, respectively. We normalise each of
these cardinalities to unity (though below we leave them in entrepreneurship equa-
tions for generality). One region cannot trade capital or ﬁnance with another
without ﬁnancial intermediation and infrastructure on a national level. There are
two possible situations at any given point in time: Either the economy operates
as two separate regions with no trade in capital or ﬁnance between regions; or we
have a combined national economy with a national output.
Figure 4 depicts the ﬂow of resources between consuming agents, intermedi-
aries, entrepreneurs and ﬁrms in our model. Agents maintain a money supply and
are given an initial capital endowment. Firms demand capital and infrastructure.
Agents can sell capital direct to ﬁrms but infrastructure is supplied by entrepreneurs
who use ﬁnancial intermediaries to raise the ﬁnance from agents. The costliness
of intermediation drives a wedge between savings and investments that impacts
upon what both ﬁrms and agents receive. Consumption optimisation by agents,
combined with a speciﬁc production function for ﬁrms, generates an endogenous
growth based on externalities in the manner of Rebelo (1991). This story abstracts
from any distinctions over integration, so we now proceed to consider the model
31depicted in the Figure under both the regional and the national context.
Figure 4: Financial Intermediation and Growth Schematic
3.2.1 Regional Growth
Two factors enter the production function: Capital, kt, and infrastructure, It. If we
assume both regions are speciﬁed identically and that initial values for capital and
infrastructure, k0 and I0, are identical in both regions then we can ﬁnd equilibrium
growth for one region knowing that it is equal to growth in the other region. So we





where 0 < α < 1. Each ﬁrm maximises proﬁts,
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There is a market for the construction of infrastructure. Agents can recognise
the demand for infrastructure by ﬁrms but cannot fund it themselves, they must
obtain the services of ﬁnancial intermediaries to raise the necessary capital. In so
doing, they become entrepreneurs. Suppose that infrastructure is produced without
capital, using money alone: It = f(Mt). The entrepreneurs’ incentive is the rent she
can charge for ﬁrms’ use of the infrastructure. Let us suppose that there are a large
number, #EA, of agents who wish to become entrepreneurs. We normalise #EA to
unity; i.e., any agent can become an entrepreneur. Further let us suppose that there





where m is the rate on ﬁnance supplied by the intermediary and MA
t is the ﬁnance
raised from each agent in region A. If we specify a simple linear production function
for infrastructure, It = Mt, then i = m. This is the perfectly competitive outcome:
If entrepreneurs could develop a monopolistic position with respect to ﬁrms or a
monopsonistic position with respect to intermediaries then there would be a surplus
to entrepreneurship in which i > m.
A ﬁnancial intermediary exists to raise ﬁnance from agents and sell it to en-
trepreneurs. Any agent who sees the demand for ﬁnancial intermediation can be-
come an intermediary. Again, we are being purposefully loose about occupational
choice here: An agent can become an entrepreneur or an intermediary or, indeed,
can do both jobs. The mingling of occupations in this fashion is not contrary to
reality, and so we do not require that agents formally choose between potential
occupations.
33We write the proﬁt to an agent from ﬁnancial intermediation at the regional
level as,
FA = #EA(1 − ψ)mMA
t − #CA(1 + φ)sMA
t , (6)
where s is the private return that consuming agents obtain from selling ﬁnance to
intermediaries.
Two costs are incurred by the intermediary. First, a cost φ of collecting ﬁnance
from agents reﬂects the costs of communicating the worthiness of investment in
terms of expected risk and return. We have seen from the historical analysis that
this cost can be signiﬁcant. Second, a cost ψ of distributing ﬁnance to entrepreneurs
reﬂects the cost of evaluating and monitoring potential entrepreneurs. For the
purposes of this analysis, we do not specify the sources of these costs analytically.
We simply take the view, following both the critique of current methodology and
the historical analysis above, that these costs exist and can be signiﬁcant. We will
take on these more fundamental issues in Nolan and Trew (ming) and Trew (2007).
Our purpose here is to capture the broad implications of our critique of current
ﬁnance and growth theory. As such, we ﬁrst construct a model in which these costs
are exogenous and think about their microeconomic roots later.
We take the view that the market for ﬁnancial intermediation is also perfectly
competitive: Given a large number of ﬁrms, agents and entrepreneurs, and given
no ﬁxed costs to becoming an intermediary, any proﬁts from intermediation are
competed away. From equation (6), with FA = 0 under perfect competition, we





Equation (7) reﬂects the wedge between saving and investment: The more eﬃcient
the ﬁnancial intermediation, the lower are the costs of collecting and disseminating
ﬁnance, and the closer are the rates of return on saving and investment.
Substituting the demand function for infrastructure from equation (4) into the












which is a simple form of Ak production which we know will generate endogenous
growth.
To close the model we specify conditions of consumer optimisation. Inﬁnitely-











Agents maintain an idiosyncratic stock of ﬁnance that is controlled by, for example,
a central bank. The central bank ensures that aggregate money supply is a constant
proportion of aggregate output. The consumer chooses how much capital to sell to
ﬁrms, how much ﬁnance to sell to intermediaries and how much to consume.








(r − ρ), (11)
which is equal to the balanced growth rate of the economy, γ. From the production










Assume that a second market for ﬁnance exists that can give agents the same return
as that on capital: Let us impose, equivalently, that agents are able to convert their
money endowment into capital. If the return on ﬁnance is greater than the return
35on capital all ﬁnance will be sold to the intermediary. If the return to agents from
selling ﬁnance to intermediaries is less than the return on capital, the ﬁnance could
be sold directly to ﬁrms as capital. Competitive intermediation thus ensures s = r
and so, from equation (12),
s = r = A





As such, from the Euler equation and this expression for the interest rate we have
in both regions the growth rate,













In the light of the historical evidence discussed above, it is reasonable to allow
for the possibility that there are signiﬁcant scale-eﬀects in the costs of ﬁnancial
intermediation; historically we have seen an initial pattern of regional industrial
take-oﬀ in industry ﬁnanced by local agents. Only once a local infrastructure is
built and the regional economy becomes mature do ﬁnancial intermediaries begin
to operate on a country-wide basis. Additionally, information problems inhibit
one region’s ability to obtain ﬁnance from another, so there is a higher cost of
coordinating investment on a national level relative to the regional level. So we
might deﬁne the national ﬁnancial intermediary conditions to be,
F∗
t = (#EA + #EB)(1 − ψ∗)i∗Mt − (#CA + #CB)(1 + φ∗)s∗Mt, (15)
where ψ∗ = Ψ + 2ω
It and φ∗ = Φ + 2ν
It , ω,ν ≥ 0. The parameters Ψ and Φ reﬂect
exogenous political and institutional factors. At early stages of development, or
if ﬁxed costs are always high, a ﬁnancial intermediary incurs additional costs to
operate at the national level, and to maintain zero-proﬁt requires a higher return on
ﬁnance sold to ﬁrms. The ﬁxed cost premia, Ψ−ψ and Φ−φ, reﬂect the diﬀerence in
underlying eﬃciency of the regional cf. the national ﬁnancial intermediary given the
36institutional environment. The non-ﬁxed costs, parameterised by ω and ν, reﬂect
the learning costs of establishing an infrastructure in order to operate an economy
at the larger level. As regional markets grow, so a regional markets gradually




2It, we eﬀectively have that the cost raising ﬁnance to build a
national infrastructure is decreasing in the size of regional markets. In the long-run,
therefore, these costs become insigniﬁcant.
Given an extensive scale eﬀect on productivity, we make the assumption that
the the coeﬃcient of technological progress at a national level is higher than that
at the regional level. The national production function is thus,
Y ∗
t = ¯ Akα
t I1−α
t , (16)
where ¯ A > A, i.e. the incentive for agents to want to fund projects at a national
level is the higher productivity of their capital and ﬁnance driven by the higher
coeﬃcient of technological progress, but this must be tempered by the cost of
funding ﬁnancial intermediation to facilitate that production. As in the case of the
regions, we can ﬁnd an analogous expression for the rate of interest to consumers
on capital and ﬁnance in the case of integration,
r∗ = ¯ A





It should be clear that r∗ will not be constant so long as ν,ω > 0. We will still
obtain a balanced growth path in the long run, but we approach it from below as






















(1 − α)(1 − Ψ − 2ω
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We will need to re-formulate this expression for any numerical simulation but, for
the moment, the transitional growth dynamics should be clear: The rate of growth
of consumption and infrastructure is inversely related to the level of infrastructure.
The rate of change of economic growth is at ﬁrst positive and reduces to zero as
time goes to inﬁnity: For an integrated national economy, limt→∞ γSR = γLR.
This growth rate will only be realised if the regional economies integrate. The
rate of interest at the national level, equation (17), reﬂects the combination of
increased productivity and increased cost of integrating the two regional economies.
Integration thus takes place if r∗ > r, where r is the rate of interest in the regional





(1 − ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
It )
(1 − Ψ − 2ω
It )(1 + φ)
!1−α
. (20)
Once this occurs, regional ﬁnance and capital supplies are combined and we have
the national production function of equation (16) and no separate regional output,
i.e. no agent would prefer to operate regionally when national output is possible.
At the point where r∗ = r the growth rate at the national level is equal to that at
the level of the regions. By equation (20), the feasibility of integrating is decreasing
in both the relative additional costs of intermediating at a national level and the
ratio of coeﬃcients of technological progress.
The timing and transition to national integration here is, save exogenous insti-
tutional change, wholly endogenous to the model. This contrasts with work such
as McDermott (2002) and Parente and Prescott (2005) where transition from one
growth path to another is exogenously imposed.
383.2.3 Equilibria
There are three possible equilibria for the economy, dependent on both parame-
ter values and the initial demand for infrastructure, I0. We either have regional
separation, national integration, or a transition from the former to the latter.
Given that over time the learning costs diminish into insigniﬁcance, the only
thing that will prevent integration in the long-run are high ﬁxed information costs





(1 − ψ)(1 + Φ)
(1 − Ψ)(1 + φ)
1−α
. (21)
So it is possible that in the presence of either a low eﬀect of integration on produc-
tivity (
¯ A
A is close to unity) or persistent high premia of pooling and coordinating
savings over the larger economy (Φ and Ψ are signiﬁcantly higher than φ and ψ)
then we can be caught in a low growth trap. As such, there is, in this case, room
for exogenous intervention to make integration feasible, i.e. we could mitigate in-
formation problems by for example legislating for contract rights. Government
intervention to build a public infrastructure will have no eﬀect on the feasibility of
integration so long as equation (21) holds because they will not overcome informa-
tion costs this way; this result thus falls nicely into the category of France vs. UK
industrial growth with regard to the diﬀerent attitudes to public infrastructure.
A second equilibrium will occur where initial infrastructure supply, I0 is such





(1 − ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0 )
(1 − Ψ − 2ω
I0 )(1 + φ)
!1−α
. (22)
In this case, either a high productivity increase from integration or very low ﬁxed
information cost can mean that a low initial infrastructure supply and low learning
cost eﬀects (low ν and ω) could create conditions such that the economy is always
integrated.
The most interesting case in terms of endogenous growth is the intermediate one,
39where the economy begins in its disintegrated form and endogenously integrates
when conditions become right. This requires,

(1 − ψ)(1 + Φ)







(1 − ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0 )
(1 − Ψ − 2ω
I0 )(1 + φ)
!1−α
. (23)
Of the three equilibria, this case perhaps comes closest to reﬂecting the actual
pattern of industrial growth. In time zero, scale costs mean that it is optimal for
ﬁnancial intermediaries operate on a small scale, using local ﬁnance to fund the
construction of a regional infrastructure. In this initial phase, growth is low. Over
time, regional markets grow and a local infrastructure is constructed to support
local output. This also lessens the cost of raising ﬁnance to build infrastructure
and integrate at a national level. At a critical value of local market size we have
national integration and a smooth take-oﬀ in growth, approaching γ∗ over time as
the economy matures. We thus have an acceleration in industrial output growth as
determined by endogenously improving conditions for ﬁnancial intermediation. In
this case there is room for exogenous action bring forward the take-oﬀ point. The
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So there is a potential role for accelerating development by reducing the costs of
information problems, as in the disintegrated equilibrium, but also here we can bring
forward the point at which we integrate via the public funding of infrastructure
technology and improving awareness. We can, therefore, draw comparisons here to
the ‘big-push’ literature of the type espoused by Murphy et al. (1989); while on a
collective basis agents could gain by integrating at the same time, individually they
face ﬁnancial intermediary costs related to the size of the entire economy, which
they cannot signiﬁcantly inﬂuence by their individual action.
403.3 Numerical Solutions
Consumption, money, capital and infrastructure all grow, in continuous time, at
the rate γ = max{γA,γ∗
SR}. For the purposes of a numerical extension we need
to consider the growth rate of the economy in a discrete-time form, so γh = (xt −
xt−h)/hxt−h for all growth variables x in the economy where h is the length of each
discrete time increment. So if we want to think of an annual growth rate while
taking quarterly increments then we let h = 1
4. In the limit as h → 0 we have
that γh → γ. In the regional economy, and in the long-run integrated economy, the
growth rate is constant. The transitional growth rate, equation (19), is dependent
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We can solve for It in terms of It−h and obtain a solution for the growth rate of
the economy that can be solved numerically. Let It = I(It−h) be the solution to,













= (1 − α)
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Of course, we need to check ﬁrst that there is only one ﬁnite and real solution to
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Table 1 gives a benchmark calibration with which we can demonstrate some of the
growth dynamics. Figure 5 plots the course of the with an initial money stock of
M0 = 20 and initial capital stock of k0 = 40. This economy is one which begins
regionally separated and integrates as endogenous ﬁnancial intermediation costs
drop over time. As can be seen, the rate of growth of the regional economy is
constant at around γA = 0.054. That of the integrated economy begins low and
41climbs to a long-run rate of around γ∗ = 0.064. The thick black line indicates the
equilibrium growth rate at any point in time, with national integration occurring at
t = 23 and a smooth transition towards the long-run growth rate of the integrated
economy.
Table 1: Calibration for Finance, Integration and Growth
initial capital k0 40
initial ﬁnance M0 20
capital share α 2/3
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
regional coeﬃcient of technological progress A 0.5
national coeﬃcient of technological progress ¯ A 0.6
ﬁxed cost parameter on regional intermediation ψ 0.25
ﬁxed cost parameter on regional intermediation φ 0.25
ﬁxed cost parameter on national intermediation Ψ 0.3
ﬁxed cost parameter on national intermediation Φ 0.3
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ν 5
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ω 5
We can embark on a calibration of this model to the data of Bairoch (1982).
There are too many free parameters to be able to pin-down a full calibration
based on the evolution of ﬁnancial eﬃciency, national integration and technological
progress. We can, however, more generally consider whether the sorts of growth
path implied by our model can capture historical trends. Table 2 gives an indicative
calibration to US and UK data. Figure 6 depicts the numerical results. There are
three things that we wish to capture from the data: First, the diﬀerent levels of
income in 1750; second, the diﬀerent rates of growth through the period of indus-
trial revolution; and, third, the diﬀerent levels of income at the end of the period.
We do not make any mid-period exogenous changes to the ﬁnancial intermediation
conditions; all growth eﬀects here are endogenous.
Of course, this is one of many stories that we can tell; a diﬀerent parameter-
isation might match the data equally well. There are two main diﬀerences that
cause the numerical growth path: First, the US has a higher level of productivity
42Figure 5: Example Growth Path
Figure 6: Calibrated US and UK Growth Paths
43Table 2: Calibration for UK and US Growth Paths
UK US
initial capital k0 10 4
initial ﬁnance M0 5 2
capital share α 2/3 2/3
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5 5
regional coeﬃcient of technological progress A 0.15 0.15
national coeﬃcient of technological progress ¯ A 0.2 0.32
ﬁxed cost parameter on regional intermediation ψ 0.25 0.275
ﬁxed cost parameter on regional intermediation φ 0.25 0.275
ﬁxed cost parameter on national intermediation Ψ 0.35 0.35
ﬁxed cost parameter on national intermediation Φ 0.35 0.35
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ν 2 1.25
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ω 2 1.25
at the national level, ¯ A; second, the learning element of national intermediation is,
in the US, substantially more rapid, i.e., the ν and ω are lower. This means that,
despite beginning with a lower initial capital endowment, the US economy catches
up and overtakes the UK one. In the US, integration occurs earlier and proceeds to
a higher long-run growth path at a faster rate. These distinctions appear to match
the historical growth patterns relatively well.
Of course, this interpretation is based on a very loose calibration. If we had data
on, say, the endogenous or exogenous evolution of ﬁnancial eﬃciency throughout
the industrial revolution then we could make substantially ﬁrmer conclusions. The
emerging time-series cliometric analyses of industrial take-oﬀ are likely to help us
in this regard. Tieing these data with an analysis of the evolution of disaggregated
coalitions would further restrict the range of possible calibrations. Moving towards
the completion of rich datasets such as Shea (2007) is likely to prove invaluable in
helping us to do this.
444 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated that by conceiving of ﬁnance and growth in a static and ag-
gregative way we lose an understanding of the underlying transmission mechanisms.
As a consequence, we are poorly armed to consider any policy implications. By look-
ing at evidence from history, we have been able to identify a greater complexity
in the transmission between entrepreneurial ﬁnance and industrial growth. Given
an appreciation of the importance of ﬁxed costs in the ﬁnance of any investment
project, we identiﬁed the ﬁnancial structures which supported the development of
physical transport infrastructure. The development of an historical database on
this matter will inform future work.
Further to the historical analysis, we developed a theory of ﬁnance and growth
that can capture some of the interrelations between scale, ﬁnance and infrastruc-
tural development. The quantitative aspects of our theory can broadly replicate
some observed historical growth paths. There are problems with the theory laid-out
above, however. In terms of matching the stylised facts of aggregate ﬁnance and
growth, we do not observe an increase in ﬁnancial depth over time. There is obvi-
ously room for improvement in the theory. The model presented here is at least a
step in the right direction. Again, completing a history of the ﬁnance of infrastruc-
ture through the industrial revolution will allow us to pin-down the quantitative
implications of the theory more precisely.
A major advance in the theory would be to make optimal government behaviour
endogenous to the model. We can outline in broad terms how this might be done:
In the early period of industrialisation, when scale costs in ﬁnancial intermediation
are very large, a government might be tempted to promote the accumulation of in-
frastructure by allocating resources to the amelioration of economy-wide ﬁnancial
constraints. Of course, there is a trade-oﬀ between the marginal positive impact
of spending on mitigating information and contracting problems and the marginal
negative impact of taxation on welfare. On the basis of this simple model, when
coalitions are spatially concentrated the marginal impact of government spending
45in promoting centralised ﬁnancial markets is minimal. The conclusion, then, is that
in the early stages of growth, a government ought to behave with a relatively light
touch, allowing private enterprise to form eﬃcient ﬁnancial structures that them-
selves mitigate information and contracting problems. The role of the government
in the early phase of industrialisation seems to be the support of private enterprise
by forming institutions that make it easier to write enforceable contracts. This has
come out of both our historical analysis and the theoretical model we constructed
to match our stylised facts. Similar messages come out of the work of Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt and Levine (2001). We turn to a more formal analysis of these propositions
in Trew (2007).
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